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Analysis of Electric Grid Security
Under Terrorist Threat
Javier Salmeron, Kevin Wood, and Ross Baldick, Member, IEEE
Abstract—We describe new analytical techniques to help
mitigate the disruptions to electric power grids caused by terrorist
attacks. New bilevel mathematical models and algorithms identify
critical system components (e.g., transmission lines, generators,
transformers) by creating maximally disruptive attack plans for
terrorists assumed to have limited offensive resources. We report
results for standard reliability test networks to show that the tech-
niques identify critical components with modest computational
effort.
Index Terms—Homeland security, interdiction, power flow.
I. INTRODUCTION
E LECTRIC power systems are critical to any country’seconomy and security. In the United States, the system’s
vulnerability to physical disruptions from natural disasters and
other causes has long been recognized [1]. This vulnerability
has increased in recent years because infrastructure has not
expanded as quickly as demand has, thereby reducing the
system’s “cushion” against failed, destroyed, or otherwise un-
available system components [2]. The threat of human attacks
on the system has become more serious, too. The Committee
on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism [3] states
the problem succinctly: “The nation’s electric power systems
must clearly be made more resilient to terrorist attack.” To help
reach this goal, this paper describes new bilevel optimization
models and solution techniques for analyzing the security and
resilience of electrical power grids against disruptions caused
by terrorist attacks. (These techniques could also help analyze
a system’s susceptibility to natural disasters, but we do not
study this issue explicitly.)
We propose techniques to identify critical sets of a power
grid’s components, e.g., generators, transmission lines, and
transformers, by identifying maximally disruptive, coordinated
(nearly simultaneous) attacks on a grid, which a terrorist
group might undertake. By studying how to attack power
grids, we will ultimately understand how to make them less
vulnerable. We report results for our techniques applied to
reliability-benchmark networks.
We search for optimal attacks, i.e., a set of attacks that causes
the largest possible disruption given posited offensive resources.
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By considering the largest possible disruptions, our proposed
protection plans will be appropriately conservative. Actual ter-
rorist “resources” will always be uncertain, so our techniques
must be fast enough to quickly analyze a wide range of prob-
able scenarios. We concern ourselves only with physical at-
tacks on the power grid and neglect the issue of “cyber-attacks”
on the controlling Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) infrastructure. The implicit assumption is that the
SCADA infrastructure has been hardened. A discussion of the
issues for reliable communication in this context is presented in
[4].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II de-
scribes the mathematical formulation of our models and de-
scribes procedures to solve them. Section III reports results of
those models and algorithms applied to two IEEE reliability test
systems. Section IV provides conclusions and points out direc-
tions for future research.
II. APPROACH
A. Overview
Our approach to identifying critical system components first
develops a network-interdiction model [5] to represent the
optimal-attack problem that a terrorist group might face. This
model is a max-min (Mm) problem
An interdiction plan is represented by the binary vector ,
whose th entry is 1 if component of the system is attacked
and is 0 otherwise. For a given plan, the inner problem is an
optimal power-flow model [6, p. 514] that minimizes generation
costs plus the penalty associated with unmet demand, together
denoted by . Here, represents power flows, generation
outputs, phase angles and “unmet demand,” i.e., the amount of
load shed; represents linearized generation costs, and the costs
of unmet demand. The outer maximization chooses the most
disruptive, resource-constrained interdiction plan , where
is a discrete set representing attacks that a terrorist group
might be able to carry out. In this model, corresponds to a
set of functions that are nonlinear in . The inner problem
involves a simplified optimal power-flow model, with constraint
functions that are, however, linear in for a fixed .
The model extends easily to handle the cost of repairs.
0885-8950/04$20.00 © 2004 IEEE
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For simplicity, we first describe a power-flow model that min-
imizes the instantaneous cost of system operation, including
unmet demand, measured in $/h. Power disruptions resulting
from cascading outages immediately after attack are ignored,
so we are actually measuring cost after initial restoration of out-
aged but undamaged equipment. Later in the paper we consider
the cost of unmet demand after the initial restoration, recog-
nizing that this cost will be changing over time as damaged
equipment is repaired following an attack.
The remainder of this section explains the basic mathemat-
ical models and algorithms our research has developed. We first
summarize our DC approximation of the AC power-flow model,
and then show how to incorporate that approximation as part
of an interdiction model. Finally, we introduce a heuristic al-
gorithm for solving the combined power-flow and interdiction
model.
B. Power-Flow Model
We approximate active power flows with a DC model, de-
noted DC-OPF (DC-Optimal Power Flow), which neglects re-
active power effects and nonlinear losses. This approximation
is normally acceptable in the context of long-term, “coarse-
grained” security analysis [6, p. 419]. In the eventual min-max
interdiction model, DC-OPF will be modified through a set of
interdiction variables.






buses at substation ;
generating units connected to bus ;
lines connected to bus ;
lines connected to substation (including
transformers, which are represented by lines);
lines running in parallel to line .
Parameters (units):
, origin and destination buses of line ; more
than one line with the same , may
exist;
bus for generator , i.e., ;
load of consumer sector at bus (MW);
transmission capacity for line (MW);
maximum output from generator (MW);
, resistance, reactance of line . (We
assume ); series susceptance is
;
generation cost for unit ($/MWh);
load-shedding cost for customer sector at bus
($/MWh).
Decision Variables (Units):
generation from unit (MW);
power flow on line (MW);
load shed by customer sector at bus (MW);
phase angle at bus (radians).
Formulation of DC-OPF: (Remark: All units above are con-








The objective of DC-OPF (DC.0) is to minimize generating
plus shedding costs measured in $/h. Constraints (DC.1) ap-
proximate active power flows on the lines. Constraints (DC.2)
maintain power balance at the buses. Constraints (DC.3) and
(DC.4) set maximum line power flows and generating-unit out-
puts. Minimum power outputs are set to zero for all generating
units for simplicity here, but extensions to nonzero minima are
straight-forward. Constraints (DC.5) state that load shedding
cannot exceed demand. A version of DC-OPF will be a sub-
problem of the interdiction model described next.
C. Interdiction Model
“The interdictor” in our model, a group of terrorists, will
make a coordinated set of resource-constrained interdictions (at-
tacks) on the power grid. We make the following assumptions
on the effect of each interdiction.
• Line interdiction: All lines running physically in parallel
at the point of an attack are opened. (Typically, these lines
are mounted on the same towers, and an attack on one is
an attack on all.)
• Transformer interdiction: The line representing the trans-
former is opened.
• Generator interdiction: The generator is disconnected
from the grid.
• Bus interdiction: All lines, generation, and load connected
to the bus are disconnected.
• Substation interdiction: All buses at the substation are dis-
connected; this triggers the corresponding bus-interdiction
effects just described.
Terrorist resource constraints can accommodate information
from intelligence sources, whether it is specific as we shall as-
sume, or generic, such as “any three attacks might happen.” For
demonstration purposes, we model this feature through a simple
knapsack constraint.
Additional Sets and Parameters Required:
, , , interdictable genera-
tors, lines, buses, and
substations, respec-
tively. These are “inter-
dictable components.”
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, , , resource required to in-
terdict generator , line
, bus , and substation
, respectively.
total interdiction re-
source available to ter-
rorists.
Interdiction Variables:
, , , binary variables that
take the value 1 if gen-
erator , line , bus
or substation , respec-
tively, are interdicted,










(Note: Nonlinear constraints in are used for conciseness






I-DC-OPF maximizes generation costs plus load-shedding
costs, which we refer to as “disruption.” (A more intuitive
definition would also subtract nominal generation cost, but this
is a constant factor we shall ignore.) Disruption is evaluated
through the inner minimization problem that consists of the
power-flow model DC-OPF with interdicted components
removed. At the outer level, (I.1) reflects the terrorists’ options
to interdict different combinations of components in the grid
without exceeding their resources. Restrictions (I.2) define
terrorist actions as binary variables and ensure noninterdiction
of certain grid components (e.g., hardened components).
Equations (IDC.1)–(IDC.5) are analogs of (DC.1)–(DC.5).
Here, however, the components that have been interdicted, di-
rectly or indirectly, are removed from the equations through the
binary interdiction variables. For example, if some line is con-
nected to an interdicted substation , i.e., , then con-
straints (IDC.1) and (IDC.3) for line yield .
The computational challenge of I-DC-OPF stems from the
max-min structure of the problem. The optimal objective value
of the linearized version of the inner minimization, as a func-
tion of continuous , is convex. Hence, I-DC-OPF involves the
maximization of a convex function, which is usually a difficult
task.
D. Interdiction Algorithm
Future research will investigate the conversion of I-DC-OPF
to a linear mixed-integer program which could be solved di-
rectly or through decomposition [7]. At this juncture, we have
devised a decomposition-based heuristic to obtain acceptable in-
terdiction plans (for the terrorists), although not necessarily op-
timal ones.
The algorithm begins by solving DC-OPF, “the subproblem,”
assuming no attacks. The result is an optimal power flow for
normal operations, a flow that should minimize generation costs
without shedding any load. The power-flow pattern is used to
assign relative values (see below) to all the components of the
power grid. Next, the algorithm solves a “master problem” to
identify an interdiction plan that maximizes the estimated value
of interdicted assets while not exceeding available interdiction
resources. With this plan, the constraints of DC-OPF are modi-
fied and the new subproblem solved. The result is a power flow
that minimizes generation costs plus the penalty associated with
load shedding, given the new interdictions. Typically, some load
will be shed in the new solution since valuable assets have been
removed from the grid.
The process continues by finding alternative interdiction
plans and by evaluating load shedding for each of them. This
algorithm may be viewed as a heuristic version of Benders
decomposition [7] to solve the bilevel program, I-DC-OPF.
The master problem incorporates super-valid inequalities
(constraints that eliminate some solutions, but not all optimal
ones, unless an optimal solution has already been identified
[5]) to avoid repeating solutions. We next provide details of the
two models required in the decomposition algorithm.
Subproblem: DC-OPF for a Specific Interdiction Plan. As-
sume that at iteration of our algorithm, a specific interdic-
tion plan is given. The
power-flow model - , (IDC.0)–(IDC.5), forms the
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subproblem and its solution yields objective value
along with power flows, gen-
eration and unmet demand, which are represented by
.
Value estimates:
The solution , provided by
- , serves to construct estimates of the attractive-
ness or “value” of components for further interdiction. To deter-
mine these estimates, we define a set of parameters which repre-
sent, essentially, estimated coefficients for a “Benders cut” that
will be added to the master problem. (In this heuristic, a cut, or a
set of aggregated cuts, is added to the master-problem objective
function rather than being added as a constraint; the super-valid
inequalities take the place of cuts that build up from iteration to
iteration.) We first compute
These totals are then used to compute:
The weights , , and are specified by
the user to reflect the relative importance of each type of com-
ponent. Experience indicates that the algorithm is more efficient
when using weights that provide higher incentives for attacks on
buses and substations than on individual lines and generators,
e.g., , , , .
We have found that the following modifications to the defi-
nition of value are useful, too: (a) The value for a component
defined above is divided by the amount of resource required to
interdict that component, to reflect value per unit of effort, (b)
a minimum value is always enforced, for reasons ex-
plained below, and (c) a running average of component values
is used rather just the current iteration’s values. Without the run-
ning average, if the power flow through a currently interdicted
component is null, the asset will be unattractive in the immedi-
ately following iteration. This is counter-intuitive. (The running
average could be computed in a variety of ways, but we use a
simple arithmetic average over all iterations.)
Master Problem: Finding a Valuable Interdiction Plan:
Assume that a set of estimated values for each component of the
grid, , has been calcu-
lated at iteration ; and, define the vector of previously generated










The solution to maximizes the estimated value
of interdicted grid components. Constraints (MP.3)–(MP.7)
serve the following purposes, respectively: Interdict a generator
or the bus it is connected to, but not both; interdict a line or
the bus it is connected to, but not both; if two lines run in
parallel, interdict one line or the other, but not both (in the
latter case, the interdiction of both lines simultaneously is
actually represented by a single variable); interdict a bus or the
substation it belongs to, but not both; and, interdict a line or
the substation it is connected to, but not both. These constraints
incorporate structural information about the system that the
linear objective function cannot. Specifically, the constraints
ensure that no system components are interdicted that are
indirectly interdicted by attacks on other components. Finally,
constraints (MP.8) ensure that the interdiction plan chosen at
the incumbent iteration is different from all plans from previous
iterations. These constraints assume that the optimal objective
of the master problem always consumes a maximal amount
of resource (i.e., insufficient resource remains to interdict any
additional components). This is ensured by requiring every
component maintain a minimum allowable value, .
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Let de-
note the solution to . The vector is used in the
subproblem to start a new iteration of the algorithm described
next.
I-ALG: Interdiction Algorithm:
Input: Grid data; Interdiction data; (iteration limit).
Output: is a feasible interdiction plan causing a disruption
with cost . If the algorithm exits because is in-





— Set (best plan so far) and .
— Set (cost of the best plan so far).
— Set .
Subproblem:
— Solve - for objective value and so-
lution .
— If then , and .
— If , then Print and halt.
Master problem:
— Compute “value estimates” using
— Solve for .




— Return to Subproblem.
III. RESULTS
A. Implementation
We have applied algorithm I-ALG to two test networks drawn
from the 1996 IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS) [8] and [9].
Tests are carried out on a 1 GHz personal computer with 1 GB
of RAM. The model and algorithm are implemented in GAMS,
which is an algebraic modeling language for numerical opti-
mization problems. GAMS enables easy generation and ma-
nipulation of the subproblems and master problems, which are
actually solved with CPLEX, a highly efficient linear- and in-
teger-programming code [10].
We restrict the number of iterations to for all prob-
lems to limit computation time. For fixed , the most difficult
problems require about 200 seconds, excluding model-genera-
tion overhead. About 90% of the time is spent solving the master
problem.
Our model is driven by generation and shedding costs. In the
examples, we assume a fixed per-unit penalty for unmet load so
only a single customer class is represented. Shedding costs are
much higher than generation costs, so we present results only in
terms of load shed.
Fig. 1. Load shedding for RTS1 as a function of interdiction resource M
(number of terrorists). Total load is 2850 MW.
Fig. 2. Load shedding for RTS2 as a function of interdiction resourceM . Total
load is 5700 MW. Results are compared to twice the load shed in RTS1 with
interdiction resource at (1=2)M .
B. Test-Case Description
The RTS examples are not intended to represent particular
systems but, rather, general reference grids that contain most
of the technologies and configurations found in typical power
grids [8]. The cases we study, One Area RTS-96 (“RTS1”) and
Two Area RTS-96 (“RTS2”), are described in detail in [8]. RTS2
duplicates RTS1 and adds three interconnections between the
duplicated areas.
Interdiction data must be defined in addition to grid data.
For these examples, we suppose that the terrorists’ resources
are quantified as a given number of people: One person is re-
quired to interdict any overhead single line or physically par-
allel overhead lines, although underground cables cannot be in-
terdicted; transformers (which are represented by lines) require
two people; three people are required to interdict any bus or sub-
station; but generators are well-protected and cannot be attacked
directly (although they can be disconnected from the grid by at-
tacking the associated bus).
C. Interdiction Plans
Figs. 1 and 2 display the amount of load shed in each grid
when total interdiction resource varies from zero to forty. The
amount of load shed is a monotonically nondecreasing function
of , with a tendency to concavity as increases; this is to be
expected.
In RTS1, any case with results in at least 90% of the
total load being shed. For the most part, RTS2 is more difficult
to interdict when compared to the RTS1 for twice the amount
of interdiction resource. For example, 2311 MW are shed in
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Fig. 3. Two interdiction plans (depicted as  and  ) for RTS1 usingM =
6. Total load is 2850 MW. Plan 1 sheds 1258 MW and plan 2 sheds 1373 MW.
The large “” indicates that the four transformers and buses in the substation
are interdicted.
RTS1 when , whereas only 4000 MW are shed in RTS2
when . The interconnecting lines may be playing an
important role in decreasing the impact of the attacks. However,
we observe the opposite effect when is small. For instance,
there is little disruption that two terrorists can cause in RTS1 but
four terrorists cause proportionately more disruption in RTS2
because they can, apparently, focus on the “weak links” of a
single area. (We caution that these observations apply to this
particular system and do not necessarily generalize.)
Determining likelihoods for each of these scenarios and in-
corporating them into a more elaborate stochastic program (e.g.,
[11] and [12]) is possible, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
It is instructive to compare two specific scenarios, however, and
we do this next for RTS1.
Two near-best plans for RTS1, for , are depicted
in Fig. 3. “Plan 1” attacks the substation and three selected
lines, shedding 1258 MW (44.1% of the total load), and “Plan
2” attacks six selected transmission lines, shedding 1373 MW
(48.2%). Plan 2 sheds more instantaneous load, but we must ulti-
mately consider the total amount of unsupplied energy while the
effects of the attack last. The 115 MW of additional short-term
load shedding in Plan 2 may be negligible compared to the
long-term disruption caused by destroying the four transformers
in Plan 1, since it is unlikely those transformers could be re-
placed or repaired quickly. We investigate this issue more for-
mally in Section III-D.
We now consider RTS2. Fig. 4 depicts the most disruptive at-
tack plan found to affect instantaneous load shedding for
. Here, 2,516 MW (44.1% of total load) is shed. Thus, dou-
bling interdiction resource from in RTS1 to
here yields not quite twice the disruption ;
compare Fig. 2. The RTS2 plan partially duplicates Plan 1 for
RTS1, which seems sensible since the RTS2 duplicates RTS1’s
structure. Note, however, that one line connecting the duplicated
areas is also interdicted.
D. Results Including Restoration Over Time
A time-phased version of I-DC-OPF is created by using inter-
diction constructs to couple instances of DC-OPF, one for each
system state that represents a stage or “time period” of system
repair. In outline, the model is
Model extends (Mm) to incorporate the hourly cost
of power flow, , in each time period , multiplied by the
period’s duration in hours, . The model could be extended
to incorporate “sub-time periods” through load duration curves,
be we have not yet explored this possibility; all loads are held
constant over time. The conversion of I-ALG to solve is
straightforward.
Data for outage durations (i.e., repair or replacement times)
are based loosely on [8]. Outage duration for transformers is 768
hours. For overhead lines, instead of the 10 or 11 hours used in
[8], we are more conservative and assume 72 hours. This is jus-
tified because (a) we expect more damage to result from the in-
tentional destruction of a line—this would probably involve the
destruction of one or more towers [13]—than the average time
needed to repair damage from common natural causes such as
lightning, and (b) if lines and other grid elements are attacked,
total repair time may be longer if fewer than repair teams are
available. We also assume that a large substation requires 768
hours for repair, but buses, for which [8] provides no data, re-
quire 360 hours. These data are summarized in Table I.
Table II presents results for each time period for attack Plans
1 and 2 in RTS1 . Immediately after the attack, Plan
2 sheds more power (1373 MW) than Plan 1 (1258 MW). But,
with power restoration over time factored in, Plan 1 causes more
disruption because repairs take longer and more total energy is
shed.
As expected, the revised model incorporating outage dura-
tions identifies a more disruptive plan, Plan 3 (see Table II and
Fig. 5) in terms of total energy shed, compared to Plans 1 and 2.
Plan 3 interdicts the large substation, a transformer in the other
substation (but without disconnecting the load associated with
the substation on the left) and one line.
E. Identifying Candidate Components for Hardening
Our ultimate goal is to identify grid components which, when
“hardened,” yield the best improvement in system security. A
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Fig. 4. An interdiction plan () for RTS2 usingM = 12. Total load is 5700 MW. This plan sheds 2516 MW.
TABLE I
REPAIR AND INTERDICTION DATA FOR GRID COMPONENTS
TABLE II
ENERGY SHED UNTIL SYSTEM REPAIR IS COMPLETE, FOR THREE ATTACK
PLANS FOR RTS1. PLAN 3 IS SUPERIOR BECAUSE IT WAS GENERATED THROUGH
(Mm ) WHICH EXPLICITLY MODELS POWER RESTORATION OVER TIME
transmission line like the one attacked in Plan 3 would be dif-
ficult or impossible to harden, although a similar effect might
be achieved by adding redundant capacity in a new, separate,
parallel corridor. However, opening up new corridors for power
lines is a slow, difficult and expensive process and a more prac-
tical alternative might be to harden the two substations that Plan
3 indicates are important. Indeed, when those two substations
Fig. 5. Interdiction plans 3 () and 4 () for RTS1 with M = 6 and
explicit modeling of system restoration over time. Total energy shed is 557 712
MWh for plan 3. Plan 4 (attack to two buses) is created assuming the two
substations attacked in plan 3 have been rendered invulnerable. Total energy
shed drops to 272 160 MWh.
are treated as invulnerable, the best attack plan found, Plan 4
in Fig. 5, sheds only 272 160 MWh of electricity compared to
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557 712 MWh for Plan 3. Hardening a substation could be ac-
complished in a number of ways, for example, by strengthening
building walls or by enclosing outdoor facilities.
The components that are identified as candidates for hard-
ening will naturally depend on the assumptions regarding ,
i.e., the terrorists’ assumed resources. If certain components ap-
pear to be critical over a wide range of values for , then it
would be reasonable to focus on those components for hard-
ening. However, more research will be required to formalize an
approach to this problem.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have formulated the problem of optimal
interdiction of an electric power network and have developed a
heuristic algorithm to solve the problem. We have demonstrated
the algorithm using two RTS systems and have indicated how the
results can be used by planners to identify critical components
whose hardening will substantially improve system security.
Critical components are identified with modest computational
effort.
Numerous issues remain for future work, and they include:
• creating linear approximations of the model (Mm) having
the form
which are amenable to exact solution methods;
• extending (Mm) and (LMm) to represent more detail about
system restoration and unmet load over time;
• extending (Mm) and (LMm) to
where the new level of optimization over rep-
resents protective measures to be taken in advance, such
as hardening particular grid components as discussed in
Section III-E. These measures will reduce the ability of
terrorists to attack the grid through the constraints rep-
resented by , and thereby improve post-attack
power flows;
• incorporating uncertainty about terrorists’ capabilities into
our analysis;
• evaluating different spare-equipment policies, including
the use of “generic” transformer spares that could provide
adequate, if imperfect, replacements for several types of
transformers;
• representing the immediate aftermath of an attack, in-
cluding cascading outages and the dynamics of voltage
collapse and angular instability.
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